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This paper argues that peaceful, global, participatory governance is possible in the 21st century 
with the aid of the Internet and other forms of abundant, instantaneous, recorded communication 
(AIRC). Such a polity, however, must replace militarized republics and autocracies to be 
realized. No historical precedent exists for militarized governments to disband voluntarily. The 
realization of peaceful, global, participatory governance depends on popular resistance in its 
most potent, yet least militaristic form—political crowds. On the basis of professional and 
independent research, analysis of primary and secondary sources, and participant observation, 
this thesis details the historical development of AIRC, the political systems it enables, and its 
potential to unite the scattered social movements that occasionally succeed in modifying and 
overthrowing individual governments, but have heretofore been incapable of replacing them with 
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This thesis argues that inadequate communication methods have hindered widespread 
egalitarian, democratic cooperation, leading to violent social conflict and oppressive governance. 
Peaceful, global participatory governance, however, is now possible with the help of the Internet, 
and other means of abundant, instantaneous, recorded communication (AIRC). Repressive 
governments and ethnocentric, anti-democratic ideology nevertheless allow violence to endure 
despite being counterproductive. There is no historical precedent for repressive governments to 
voluntarily abdicate power, or for technological advances alone to alter political systems. There 
is, however, a long-established tradition of mostly unarmed and unorganized citizens achieving 
political goals by forming crowds that halt the machinations of repressive governments through 
non-violent non-cooperation, occupation of strategic space, and tactical violence as a weapon of 
last resort. The Internet enables resistance movements throughout the world to coordinate mass 




  AIRC 
AIRC is an acronym for abundant, instantaneous, recorded communication, which 
includes short-message-services (SMS), email, file-shares, and the World-Wide-Web. 21st 
century communiqués travel tens of millions of times faster than they did a few hundred years 
ago, and can be computed at approximately one quadrillionth the cost.1 The development of 
handheld AIRC devices—smartphones—has decentralized the means of communication, adding 
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to the abundance of communiqués. Finally, humanity possesses the economic capacity—yet not 
the political will—to provide AIRC to everyone, everywhere, at any time. The establishment of 
‘everybody-to-everybody’ communication would enable equal access to political discourse, and 
equal voting capabilities regarding all public decisions. 
  Power 
Power is people’s potential and kinetic transformation of their surroundings. Power is 
conducted by individuals and enhanced quantitatively and qualitatively through cooperation. 
‘Repression’ occurs when people treat others not as cooperators, but as things to be transformed, 
killed, or displaced. The superior power of cooperation makes repression most productive when 
used not to kill and physically manipulate others’ limbs, but to coerce others into using their 
power in a prescribed manner, a cooperative dynamic known as ‘exploitation.’ Exploitative 
cooperation can additionally be achieved absent the threat of violence, through cultural and 
intellectual persuasion—often referred to as ‘hegemony.’2 The synthesis of repressive, 
exploitative, and hegemonic power will be referred to as ‘oppressive power.’ 
Autocracy + Democracy = Republic 
 ‘Autocracy’ will refer to political systems in which oppressive power is concentrated in 
one person or organization. Examples of autocracies in this paper include the French, Iranian, 
and Nepali monarchies, the domestic Egyptian and Nicaraguan military dictatorships, and 
foreign occupations. ‘Democracy’ will refer to the peaceful, timely resolution of social conflict 
through collective planning, equal voting power, and cooperation by the ideological minority 
according to the terms voted on by the majority. 
Abstractly, ‘republics’ are political systems in which enfranchised individuals 
democratically vote for representatives who democratically vote amongst themselves on issues, 
 3 
or on additional layers of representation. All ‘representative’ political parties will be referred to 
as ‘republican’ parties, including the U.S. Democrats and Republicans, the Bolsheviks, the 
Indian National Congress, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Nepali Maoists. Historically, all 
republics have been complex autocratic-democratic hybrids formed by the struggle between 
autocratic and democratic social movements. Thus, each republic falls somewhere on the 
spectrum between autocracy and democracy. Republics on the democratic end of the spectrum—
such as those in England, Germany, Turkey, India, and Japan—are typically ruled by parliaments 
made up of democratically elected parties that legislate exclusively, yet democratically, and form 
majoritarian coalitions to control their nations’ militaries. Republics that are somewhat more 
autocratic—such as the U.S., France, Russia, and most of Latin America—have presidents that 
operate autocratically within the confines of the executive branch, but who nonetheless are 
democratically elected by the populace, and are held in check by other, more democratic 
branches of government. Governments like Iran’s and China’s, finally, push the limits of what 
can be called a ‘republic,’ and what must be termed an ‘autocracy.’ 
Daily life even in highly democratic-republics remains largely private.3 Privately owned 
businesses are held in check by republican laws, but are governed by individuals or groups of 
owners who may vote amongst themselves, but nevertheless are not voted into ownership and 
wield significant autocratic powers over their employees. Private homes may likewise be held in 
check by republican laws, but are usually ruled autocratically by patriarchs, adults, and other 
intra-family power dynamics. Deaths attributable to work exceeded all violent deaths in 2002.4 
Domestic violence is so private as to be hard to calculate, though effects upwards of half of 
women and children.5 Given the autocracy of private affairs, comparing the autocratic-
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democratic dialectic of overall societies—such as China and the U.S.—is more complex than 
merely comparing their public sectors. 
Crowds 
Crowds may form to achieve political goals, or to participate in religious, music, and 
sporting festivals. Crowds differ from other human aggregates—such as traffic—by coordinating 
mass actions, such as chanting, or committing mass arson. This thesis, however, is concerned 
only with political crowds in the context of their opposition to repressive governments that serve 
and protect oppressive social hierarchies. Crowds, nevertheless, may enforce established social 




The End of History?7 
 Academics of various disciplines dissected mass movements throughout the 20th century. 
James C. Davies and Charles Tilly documented the economic, political, and repressive 
conditions that typically led to mass mobilizations.8 Frances Fox Piven and Misagh Parsa 
explored the social processes that typically resulted in widespread and sustained mobilizations.9 
Ervand Abrahamian and Barbara Ehrenreich revealed the playful, yet militant nature of crowds.10 
Mancur Olson and James A. Morone explained some of the social dynamics that have limited the 
power of mass movements, and have allowed the reestablishment of exclusive, oppressive 
polities.11 Most of these scholars seem to disagree with Francis Fukuyama, who claimed after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall: “the triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the 
total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”12 His assertion, 
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however, is not contradicted by their research, which suggests that mass movements have 
regularly overthrown autocracies, and have dramatically altered social hierarchies within 
republics, but have been unable to create fair, democratic polities that rely on mass, direct 
participation. 
 Studies regarding the political impact of AIRC have been largely limited to local and 
regional social movements, and their ability to overthrow autocrats and modify republics. The 
result is that these studies exaggerate the power of the Internet to impact local politics, while 
overlooking the Internet’s transformative global impact. Authors like Clay Shirky, Nahed 
Eltantawy, and Gilad Lotan have explored 21st century political activism against autocratic 
governments, focusing on the extent to which hardware and software was used to mobilize 
crowds in Belarus, Tunisia, and Egypt.13 Any causal claim they make is vulnerable to refute by 
the existence of all pre-Internet revolutions, or the fact that the crowd in Egypt grew 
considerably after the Internet was almost completely shut down on the night of Jan 24.14 
Authors such as Harry Bouwman, Paul H.A. Frissen, and John Taylor, meanwhile, detail AIRC’s 
ability to improve republican governance, whether by informing the public, enabling this public 
to communicate better with its representatives, or by digitizing government services.15 This 
research suggests that crowds can overthrow autocracies and modify republics, and that the 
Internet can make both crowds and republics better and faster. Fukuyama’s assertion that there is 
no viable alternative to Western liberalism, meanwhile, remains intact. 
  (Non) Viable (Non) Alternatives 
Social theorists Michael Albert, Erik Olin Wright, and Frissen have each posed 
alternative societies that are more democratic and egalitarian than our own, and contain elements 
of Karl Marx’s maxim—people working according to their abilities, and consuming according to 
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their needs.16 Nevertheless, none of these alternatives involve global, participatory democracy or 
global resource sharing, thus requiring republican solutions—or no solutions in Frissen’s case—
to global conflict. These alternatives do not de-commodify labor or consumer goods, but instead 
maintain ‘socially necessary labor’ as the basis for valuing goods, and private property as the 
basis for determining who has access to which consumer goods, thus valuing people.17 Frissen 
and Albert, moreover, do not sufficiently address how people today can challenge the power of 
militarized republics. Ultimately, each hypothetical is either not an alternative to contemporary 
society, or is not a viable alternative. 
In Public Administration in Cyberspace (1998) Frissen “develop[s a] new theory of 
anarchism,” based not on a “pyramid[,] but an archipelago of contested and fragmented 
meanings and institutions.”18 Rightfully noting that enhanced communication techniques have 
dwindled the managerial class, Frissen sees this as an opportunity not to enable everyone to 
participate in management, but to free humanity from management.19 Dismissing pluralist 
democracy as the “science… of control and problem solving,” Frissen advocates “a ‘cool’ way 
of doing science: no ideals, no convictions, no beliefs.”20 Whether or not his system is 
economically viable, or could resist organized, militarized societies of millions, his insistence 
that AIRC enables this form of anarchism is contradicted by history. “An archipelago of 
contested… institutions” accurately describes the pre-AIRC world of sovereign, competing 
bands, clans, tribes, nations, and corporations, as well as the world today. 
In Parecon (2003), Michael Albert imagines an alternate society that attempts to 
empower workers by substituting capital markets with entitlements and earned privileges.21 
Parecon—a portmanteau meaning ‘participatory economics’—advocates replacing autocratic 
and republican capitalist production with a similar, unaccountable archipelago of democratic but 
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exclusionary workers’ councils.22 Consumption in Parecon is based on a minimum standard of 
living decided by a series of increasingly exclusionary, republican residential councils that begin 
at the neighborhood level, advance to the ward level, and reach their apex at the county level.23 
Such parochial bureaucracy may have been necessary for pre-internet societies, but is no longer 
necessary. 
Albert, moreover, idealizes labor, rightfully distrusts people to voluntarily work 
according to his standards, and reintroduces labor and consumer markets to solve these 
problems. Albert proposes that people be coerced into working harder than they would like to by 
rewarding overproduction with increased consumption privileges and “social recognition,” 
reminiscent of the Pavilions for Declaring Goodness in Ming Dynasty China.24 Rather than a 
capitalist labor market, each workers’ council would be required to quantify the ‘natural’ 
difficultly of every task, as well as each individual’s ‘natural’ capability to complete each task. 
By factoring together difficultly, capability, and individually-necessary-labor-time—which 
would require multiple people to monitor everything everybody does—workers’ councils could 
calculate ‘effort,’ and reward it with consumption rights above and beyond republican derived 
entitlements. Albert does not attempt to similarly alter consumer goods markets, perhaps 
recognizing that capitalist markets are—if nothing else—efficient enough to facilitate everyday 
consumption. According to historian Roy Mottahedeh: 
Information about prices is… the quickening breath that sustains the life 
of the bazaar, and the mechanism by which these prices adjust to new 
information on supply and demand is so refined as to seem almost 
divine. “God sets prices,” according to a saying ascribed to the Prophet 
Mohammed, and most medieval Islamic jurists agreed than an unseen 
hand that operated with such efficiency must be the hand of God.25 
 
Parecon, ultimately, is a federal republic dominated by Protestant-work-ethic fueled worker-
bureaucrats whose every move is watched and judged by omnipresent workers’ councils. Such a 
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society is not only impractical, but contains enough local and personal advantages, and 
potentially unresolvable social conflicts to drive the privileged toward the restoration of private 
ownership and capital markets. Rewarding overproduction with overconsumption, moreover, is a 
sure recipe for environmental disaster. 
In Envisioning Real Utopias, Erik Olin Wright identifies several local experiments in 
participatory democracy and egalitarian consumption—including Participatory Budgeting (PB), 
which I will discuss at length in Chapter 1—and addresses several short- and long-term strategies 
that such movements can use to challenge the authority of repressive governments.26 Wright 
suggests each experiment and strategy might play a role in “subordinat[ing] the state to civil 
society” and creating “participatory socialism.”27 Each of Wright’s economic solutions, however, 
is market-based, including “labor-controlled solidarity funds,” “unconditional basic income,” and 
workers’ collectives such as the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation.28 His model democracies 
are exclusionary rather than global, and while participatory on a local level, require 
representation and supervision of representatives beyond that.29 Wright identifies Wikipedia as a 
“technology-mediated… voluntary association,” but does not suggest that such a network-
produced global project has only recently been made possible by AIRC, and that AIRC can 
similarly enable a global polity in which anybody can take part in any social decision, rather than 
relying on representatives.30 Wright is admittedly critical of his own propositions, but suggests 
that the totality of these myriad arguments makes up for a single, viable alternative to capitalism 
and republican democracy. Wright, like Frissen and Albert, ultimately imagines a federated, 
republican ‘archipelago’ of sovereigns not particularly different from the national and 




By synthesizing and building upon the aforementioned works, I will argue that the 
Internet has the capability to enable global resistance to capitalism, autocracy, and 
republicanism, and the power to facilitate peaceful, global, participatory governance. I will 
additionally delineate the social processes needed for such a political evolution. This thesis will 
blend the disciplines of history, sociology, and political science to analyze past and present 
societies, and extrapolate an immediately feasible, but as yet unrealized alternative. Using the 
method described by Charles Tilly in Historical Sociology, contemporary and historical social 
structures and processes will be examined alongside one another to chart the political 
development of human society.31 Unlike Tilly’s quantitative analysis of every documented 
rebellion, my focus will be on ‘revolutionary’ crowds that have succeeded in either overthrowing 
or radically altering social hierarchies and political systems, thus making this thesis more 
‘historical political science.’ 
The link between communication, governance, and oppression will guide Chapter 1, 
which will chart the evolution of communications technology and analyze the political systems 
that are suited to each form of communication, including the Iroquois Confederacy, the United 
States of America, and the Soviet Union. Chapter 1 will include a case study of New York City’s 
Participatory Budgeting process (NYC-PB), examining whether it is viable alternative to 
republican democracy, and how it can utilize 21st century communications technology to foment 
widespread participation. Chapter 1 will finally include a description of how global labor and 
consumption could be carried out and managed voluntary, and social conflict resolved through 
global negotiation and democracy. 
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Chapter 2 will detail why the evolution of communications technology enables—but does 
not necessitate—the evolution of political systems. Social, political, and cultural factors will 
explain why oppression endures in the 21st century despite being unnecessary and 
counterproductive. Chapter 2 will recognize all forms of oppressive power—including class, 
gender, nationality, race, age, ability—but will deal primarily with interpersonal power in its 
most concentrated, potent, and widespread contemporary forms: militaristic governments versus 
political crowds. Chapter 2 will discuss the social processes that have enabled crowds to 
manifest, and temporarily overcome oppressive power, but that have thus far enabled new 
oppressive polities to arise, or old ones to resurrect. The primary focus of this chapter will be the 
role of the crowd in what I will call the ‘Global Rebellion of 2010-3’—encompassing the Arab 
Spring revolutions and Occupy rebellions, among others. I will additionally draw upon various 
commonalities between historical crowd-enabled revolutions, including the French, Russian, 
Indian, Egyptian (1952), Iranian, and Nepali revolutions. Finally, putting into practice the more 
abstract theories devised in Chapter 1, I will examine the power and limitations of AIRC on the 
mobilization and machinations of contemporary crowds, and the role that AIRC-enabled crowds 
might play in bringing about peaceful, global, participatory governance. 
In the Conclusion, I will explore a few of today’s globally recognized problems, 
including corporate consolidation and malfeasance, the NSA spying program, environmental 
destruction, and the threat of nuclear war. Using the methodology established in Chapters 1 & 2, 
I will explain the dynamic process whereby anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian institutions 
simultaneously develop the technical and social infrastructure required for peaceful, global, 
participatory governance, while repressing social movements that aim to achieve such a state. I 
will additionally examine how these global conflicts—and the real possibility of human 
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extinction—may deepen existing oppression or prompt the global solidarity needed to manifest a 
global revolution that perhaps may bring about peaceful, global, participatory governance.  
This thesis will survey a variety of print and digital first and second hand sources, 
including academic papers, news media, court records, and websites. I will additionally draw 
upon my personal experience as a researcher, journalist, community organizer, and participant-
observer in political parties, crowds, and democratic experiments. Chapter 1’s analysis of NYC-
PB derives from two years of participant observation, as well as research I conducted as an intern 
at the Urban Justice Center’s Community Development Project (CDP).32 References to the 2006 
Nepali revolution originate in part from research I conducted in Kathmandu, Gorkha, and Rolpa, 
the results of which have been published previously under the name Fritz Tucker.33 Chapter 2’s 
discussion of Occupy Wall Street includes participant observation previously chronicled in the 
Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations, Manhattan’s weekly print newspaper Our 
Town Downtown, and a variety of digital media.34 Knowledge regarding the Working Families 
Party (WFP)’s role in Occupy Wall Street stems from unpublished accounts of my experience as 
a WFP employee from 2011-2.
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CHAPTER 1: THE EVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL OF THE INTERNET 
Chart A: Historical Governing Potential 
 
Chart A divides history into five eras, which represent timeframes, not deadlines. The 
corresponding forms of communication, transmission, etc. are not universal, but rather the 
predominant ones used by the dominant societies of each era. It was only during the last century 
that the majority of humans became literate.35 Literacy, however, has never guaranteed regular 
access to literature. Today, nearly a third of humanity has regular access to a library—the Web—
that contains more written and recorded information than any other ever.36 Universal literacy and 
instant access to all human records are no longer prevented by technical or productive 
limitations, but by social conflict. 
 
Slow, Oral Communication 
Language Barriers 
Social conflict is more likely when communication is absent or ineffective.37 
Governance, meanwhile, is impossible without communication. The prevalence of violence 
throughout human history is logical, given that groups were physically incapable of regular 
communication beyond a few dozen miles, and were not necessarily capable of linguistic 
communication with their neighbors. A group incapable of communicating with its neighbors 
might maximize its power to transform its surroundings and cooperate with others by killing or 
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displacing these neighbors and settling their land with members of its own linguistic community. 
Separated by enough space, even groups that are linguistically capable of communication cannot 
constantly negotiate peaceful solutions to quotidian quarrels, and thus might erroneously—or 
even rationally—resort to violence.  
Oral communication is well adapted for solving conflict that arises between groups of 10-
100 people in direct proximity to each other. Regional linguistic communities that wish to obtain 
more territory and cooperative power—but which depend on slow, oral communication—must 
find ways to govern without everybody-to-everybody communication. In the absence of 
instantaneous communication, rapid transit, and densely urbanized space, the five Iroquois 
nations could not organize direct negation between a few thousand people confined to Upstate 
New York.38 Representatives of these nations instead convened occasionally in a central 
location: Onondaga.39 The Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy—which helped inspire the 
federal government of the United States—mandated that conflict be settled through dialog 
between the 50 Iroquois chiefs.40 Even with 50 people, dialogic conflict resolution may have 
proved too difficult. The 50 Iroquois chiefs were split into bicameral discussion groups, both of 
which required unanimity.41 Their political system could thus be called a federal, republican 
dialogracy. 
 The Practical Limitations of Hearsay 
Oral communication typically requires human relays through space and time that rely on 
the health of each individual and his or her ability to remember and transmit the entire 
communiqué. Some lengthy oral communiqués—such as the Iroquois Constitution, the Rigveda, 
the Odyssey, and the Qur’an—may have been transmitted verbatim for many generations. 
Individuals have also run marathons to deliver important communiqués. Even so, the longer each 
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communiqué and the more people involved in its communication, the more opportunity there is 
for error. Court transcripts of the Salem Witch Trials exemplify this imprecision. On 29 August 
1692, Mary Barker testified that Goody Johnson had turned her into a witch, a claim that could 
have ended in Johnson’s death.42 Even a high-stakes, legally binding communiqué such as 
Baker’s does not seem to have been intended to be a verbatim account of the event. Justice John 
Higgenson’s court transcript, likewise, was his interpretation of the testimony, not a literal 
transcription. Hearsay, thus, is not particularly reliable at best, and can just as easily be entirely 
fictional. 
Slow, oral hearsay, while not ideal, may facilitate participatory governance among scores 
of people—like villages or workplaces—and republican governance among thousands: such as 
the Iroquois Confederacy, or Occupy Wall Street’s Spokes Council.43 History, however, provides 
no precedent for a densely populated urban society dependent on food importation being able to 
coordinate the vital, daily transaction of goods and services without precise, abstract, alienable, 
and transmittable information. Most urban societies have used numbers, calendars, currencies, 
and at least pictographs to represent basic foods and social relations. Even a system of 
abstraction and alienation as seemingly simple as quipu—the Andean communication method 
using colored, knotted cords—was complex enough to facilitate a society of millions, a task that 
could not have been completed by memory.44 
 Production and Storage of Oral Communiqués 
Different communication methods affect the scope of governance, as well as its form. In 
a community dependent on unrecorded, oral communication, harmony relies on speakers taking 
turns.45 In Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations (2008), 
Clay Shirky labels such communication “one-to-one” and “one-to-many.”46 Instantaneous, 
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unrecorded communication—typified by radio and television—enables ‘one-to-everybody’ 
communication, and parallel governing structures. Abundant, instantaneous, recorded 
communication (AIRC) permits ‘everybody-to-everybody’ communication. The Internet has 
created the capacity—though not the reality—for everybody to compose abundant public 
communiqués that can be accessed by everybody, anytime, anywhere. Any political system—
real or imagined—that does not take advantage of this equalizing capability is archaic. 
 
Written Communication 
 The Physical Properties of Writing 
Writing—like oral communication—requires transmission via humans, aside from the 
occasional use of independent carrier-birds. Between the harnessing of wind and horsepower and 
the advent of steam power, the most powerful chiefs, emperors, and presidents could only 
regularly send long-distance communiqués at approximately 25 Mph. The fastest methods of 
delivering communiqués, coincidentally, were the most powerful weapons—ships and horses. It 
should not be surprising then, given the speed and form of delivery, that imperial communication 
networks were geographically similar to wealth-redistribution networks. Raw and labored-upon 
materials were mostly sent in the opposite direction of communiqués, from oppressed to 
oppressor—though sent back to the oppressed if needed to quell rebellion.47  
Literature allows ideas to be stored indefinitely. Unlike audio-visual recordings, writing 
does not allow consumers to re-experience the past, but rather access each author’s 
interpretations of history—and occasionally an author’s purposefully misleading falsehoods.i 
Accurate or not, written information was only as good as the paper it was printed on. Widespread 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i For an example of literature that blends truth with artistically and politically motivated 
falsehood, see: Heller, J., (1988). Picture This. Putnam: New York. 
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use of literature necessitates regular transcription by a class of literati, who must keep old texts 
up to date with contemporary literary traditions and the ever-evolving vocabulary and 
grammatical structures of the spoken word.48 Even so, millions of ideas and labor-hours have 
been carelessly and purposely destroyed, a fate met by much early Islamic literature.49 Had it not 
been for the timely death of Ögödei Khan, and had the Mongolian power structure not required a 
face-to-face meeting in Mongolia to decide his successor, much mediaeval European literature 
could have easily met a similar fate.50 
The Political Ramifications of Writing 
Precise, alienable communiqués technically enabled global governance. The scope and 
quality of historical governments, however, were limited by transmission speeds, and production 
and storage capabilities. Written communiqués that require days or years for transmission cannot 
replace face-to-face dialog for negotiating resolutions to all social conflicts in a timely manner. If 
a third person joins an equal dialog, everybody involved can only speak a third (1/3) of the time. 
Each new person who joins a dialog adds one integer to the denominator (1/X), increasing 
communication difficulties, though on a decelerating J-curve. Written communication, on the 
other hand, increases in complexity both quantitatively and qualitatively with each new addition 
to the communication group. All 50 Iroquois chiefs participating in the Grand Council in 
Onondaga could have transmitted nearly a half-hour’s worth of communiqués to every other 
chief in 24 hours. Had the Iroquois chiefs stayed home and written each other—and had they all 
lived exactly one day away from each other—each communiqué would have required 49 pieces 
of writing, and 98 labor-days for delivery and return. One round-robin would have taken over 
three months, and would have required over 13 labor-years, not including the labor involved in 
composing the 2,450 communiqués from natural resources. Each additional person who joined 
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this writing group would have increased the amount of labor and resources by additional 
factorials, represented by an increasing J-curve. Negotiation among equals in a society of 
millions was just as impossible with slow, written communication as it was with slow, oral 
communication. If societies were to maximize their cooperative power, however, they would 
need to continually incorporate more people who they could not regularly negotiate with, a 
process that has historically relied in part on writing, and with it a different purpose to 
communication. Regional, national, and international societies have typically been governed 
through one-to-many communications by dictators—in the literal sense of the word—who 
command rather than negotiate with their subjects. The Iroquois nations could have adopted a 
political system based on writing, but would have had to abandon their federal, republican 
dialogracy in favor of a political systems based on one-to-many communication, such as 
monarchy. 
Writing’s labor-intensive production and storage processes favor centralized power and 
class variation. Only societies able to harness enormous amounts of raw materials and skilled 
labor could regularly communicate highly reliable information over long distances. 
Centralization of skilled labor, the means of production, and storage facilities—libraries—is 
unjust, but economical. Literacy, moreover, does not come as naturally as linguistic skills. 
Insofar as select occupations and navigation of public space does not require literacy, there are 
economic benefits to a society that does not train everybody to be literate. Counter-intuitively, 
those at the apex of power structures who can harness the labor of others are often illiterate as 
well. That Jesus and Muhammad were likely illiterate, and that Senator John McCain calls 
himself “computer illiterate,” suggests not that these powerful men have lacked intelligence, but 
that privilege has allowed—and political structures have demanded—that they devote all their 
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time to the most important, effective social task—talking and listening—while others do 
everything else for them.51 The economic benefits to centralization and class variation, however, 
do not explain why Brahmin, Chinese bureaucrats, the Catholic Church, White-American slave-
owners, and men across the globe have gone out of their way to suppress literacy and access to 
literature among opposing castes, classes, races, and genders.52 Repression and monopolization 
are economically counterproductive, but do produce and maintain oppressive privilege. 
Urbanization and regional governance, however, necessitated writing, and with it the likelihood 
of social stratification. 
 
Railroads, Records, and Republics 
  From History to Record 
 Compared to the technological progress of the previous few thousand years, 
communication methods changed rapidly during the 19th century. Photo- and phonographs 
allowed audio-visuals to be recorded, alienated, and viscerally re-experience by consumers, 
rather than approximated through descriptions and renderings. Recorded facial and gestural 
communiqués provoked emotion in consumers more efficiently, reliably, and cross-culturally 
than did written words. As with literature, oppressors have developed and utilized audio-visual 
technology while suppressing its use by those they oppress. After Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART) authorities publicly shot and killed an unarmed, prone Oscar Grant, BART 
spokesperson Linton Johnson said the widespread online availability of three videos capturing 
the incident from separate angles did “a disservice to the integrity of the investigation because 
people form opinions, and then they can’t give independent recollections of what they actually 
saw because they are tainted by the videos.”53 Nevertheless, audio-visual evidence changed the 
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way ordinary people analyze the veracity of claims. In Islamic Historiography (2003), Chase 
Robinson writes “whereas written history can be made to conform closely to the imperative of 
the present, oral history always conforms to it.”54 Whether or not this is true, people today are as 
skeptical toward anything not caught on tape as last millennium’s historians and anthropologists 
were toward oral tradition. 
  An Industrial—Not a Communication—Revolution 
The most notable technological development of the 19th century was the development of 
the steam engine. Electric communications technology had been invented, but was not 
streamlined until the 20th century. The steam engine increased transportation speed by a power of 
ten and production capacity by hundreds of times—quantified in terms of the power of typical 
horses.55 This industrialization enabled a demographic shift on par with that caused by the 
domestication of plants and animals. Centralized, steam-powered factories provided jobs in cities 
for former peasants, who were brought to the cities more efficiently and fed with imported food, 
all due to the power of steam. Printing presses made tens of thousands of copies an hour, 
requiring over a billion pounds of paper to be produced in the U.K. in 1900.56 Literacy and 
literature flourished, allowing more voices than ever to join public discourse. Newfound 
opportunities for oral communication impacted all urbanites, not just the growing literate 
minority. A 19th century urbanite’s daily opportunity for oral communication extended to 
populations that would have required decades of travel throughout villages to match. 
These epochal changes in industry, however, left unchanged the one-to-many nature of 
human communication. Precise communication still necessitated human transportation, albeit 
mechanized and at speeds closer to 100 Mph. Communiqués could not be produced, stored, and 
transmitted in a manner that allowed everyone to regularly negotiate resolutions to social conflict 
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with everybody else. The most advanced communication techniques, moreover, still relied on 
increasingly complex, centralized production processes that could be monopolized by elites. 
  Crowds: Auxiliary Forces 
The most dramatic effect of mass urbanization was the ever-larger crowds it facilitated 
and the impact this had on political systems. Armed only with primitive weapons and facing 
increasingly powerful firearms, it was citizens’ solidarity that gave them a more potent short-
range weapon than anything possessed by professional militaries. At the forefront of this battle 
was the Parisian crowd, which overthrew the French government in 1789, 1795, 1830, 1848, and 
1871.57 Individual cities captured by crowds, however, could be laid siege to by cannon. 
Revolutionary, urban crowds were not equipped or organized to chase professional armies 
through forests, mountains, deserts, and swamps. 19th century crowds could also not count on 
simultaneous, intra- and international rebellions such as exist in today’s globalized society. To 
compete with urban crowds, political capitals—such as Versailles, Washington D.C., Albany, 
and Calcutta—once the foci of urbanity, were removed from major population centers, which 
themselves were redeveloped to incorporate long, broad avenues suitable for shooting cannon 
into the midst of crowds.58 Ordinary citizens, nevertheless, were able to hold their governments 
accountable like never before. 
What 19th century crowds could not do was govern. Despite the often egalitarian, 
democratic attitudes of revolutionaries, post-revolution polities were only as democratic and 
egalitarian as communications technology, social processes, and cultural factors allowed them to 
be. Unable to accommodate the direct, dialogic, and democratic participation of everybody who 
participated in the revolution, post-revolution polities were typically dominated by well-
organized elites. Crowds, moreover, do not necessarily mobilize or succeed in achieving political 
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demands just because conditions haven’t changed, or have gotten worse. This is especially true if 
new leaders are popularly perceived as revolutionary icons. This process—rule by an exclusive 
elite, overthrow by an energetic majority, rule by a different exclusive elite—has aptly been 
described as ‘revolutionary,’ a word that may or may not imply forward progress, but definitely 
implies a return to something resembling the original state of affairs. 
 The Rise of Republics 
Industrialization enabled republican governance by facilitating the growth of densely 
populated urban areas and faster travel between rural ones, allowing for occasional—but not 
constant—elections. Political evolutions from autocracy to republic were forced upon autocrats 
by urban mobilizations in every case, from the U.S. and France, to Iran and Nepal. Even then, 
various social groups often had to fight for suffrage one by one. When the U.S. republic was 
founded, only propertied, White men were allowed to vote for and become representatives. Poor 
White men, then Black men, then all women, then Black Southerners again had to fight deadly 
battles for the right to vote—not on issues, but to elect people who would ostensibly represent 
them.59 Voter suppression, nevertheless, remains rampant in the 21st century U.S.60 
Republican governance is a pragmatic solution to the historical dilemma of slow, limited, 
unrecorded communication. Republics aren’t ideal for autocrats, who typically try to 
compromise democratic processes, or move as many social interactions as possible out of the 
democratic arena and into the private. Republics aren’t ideal for democrats either, who prefer 
direct participation. In the 19th century, however, direct participation was unachievable on a 
global, national, and even regional scale. Thus, democrats had to either accept non-ideal levels of 
participation in ever-expanding republican polities, or hearken back to more participatory, local 
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 (Non) Physical Properties 
In the 20th century, streamlined manipulation of electromagnetic waves essentially 
negated space and time for earthbound communiqués, turning the entire world into a giant 
village. Electrical telegraphs and radios enabled communiqués to be alienated not only from their 
creators, but from all human accompaniment. Conference calls enabled group discussion 
resembling the Iroquois’ Grand Council without requiring travel time, but without the benefit of 
visual cues. Enhanced communication speed enabled one-to-everybody communication, but did 
not solve key problems regarding production, storage, and consumption, and thus did not enable 
everybody-to-everybody communication the way computers would by the end of the century. 
Until then, instantaneous radio and telegraphic communication was a return to oral 
communication, and all the problems associated with it. Global, participatory governance 
remained confined to science-fiction novels, such as Alexander Bogdanov’s Martian communist 
colony in Red Star (1908).61 
Light-Speed Demagoguery and Subversive Radio 
The increased speed and scope of communication primarily benefitted those who owned 
the means of communication production. It allowed some of the 20th century’s most influential 
nationalists—including Hitler, Roosevelt, Nasr, and Castro—to speak directly to practically all 
of their subjects, and to their extra-national sympathizers.62 Television added faces and gestures 
to communiqués, strengthening this one-way bond between producers and consumers. 
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Consumers could influence production by choosing whether or not to listen, and what to listen 
to.63 Producers, therefore, competed with one another by tailoring content to consumers’ tastes, 
and by monitoring who was consuming what, when, where, and why.64 By developing constant 
multimedia content and expanding service economies, governments and major media 
corporations enabled some consumers to live more sedentary and isolated lives than ever. On the 
other hand, mass ownership of and access to two-way communication devices—such as 
telephones—may not have enabled global, participatory governance, but did expand the scope of 
public discourse in unprecedented ways. Political activists took advantage of the power of 
instantaneous communication to propagate their ideas more widely than ever, and to mobilize 
crowds around the world. 
The political importance of instantaneous communication can be seen in the targeting of 
telecommunications infrastructure during violent conflict—for purely military reasons, and in 
order to influence public perception. Revolutionary crowds in Iran and Egypt targeted 
telecommunications infrastructure, while Fidelista and Sandinista guerillas in Cuba and 
Nicaragua prioritized the capture of radio stations in order to try to mobilize urban crowds.65 In 
2011, Egyptian crowds torched the National Democratic Party’s headquarters in Cairo, police 
stations throughout the nation, and looted the files of the secret police.66 This was tolerated by 
the Egyptian military, which only intervened as the Cairene crowd surrounded the presidential 
palace and state television station.67 
 Global Republics 
Shortly after streamlining instantaneous communication, people attempted global 
governance, the autocratic-republican-democratic dialectic of which was shaped by existing 
intra- and international power dynamics. The League of Nations (1919-1946), like the Iroquois 
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Confederacy, involved dozens of sovereign governments organizing collective action through 
consensus rather than democracy. Reliance on consensus allowed more powerful governments in 
the League of Nations to bully less powerful ones when intractable conflict arose. Western 
European governments insisted that ascension by Eastern European governments to the League 
be contingent on commitments to protect minority rights.68 These same Western nations then 
blocked Japan’s proposal that every member “commit itself to racial equality.”69 Protecting the 
rights of Eastern Europe’s German minority became a major platform of the Weimar Republic, 
which later used this rhetoric to rationalize leaving the League and militarily manifest a ‘Greater 
Germany.’70 The United Nations (1945-present) constitutes over a hundred governments that 
purport to represent practically every territory and person on earth. These governments—
autocracies and republics alike—ostensibly sacrifice some of their sovereignty to the U.N.’s 
republican processes. Nevertheless, the veto power of the world’s five most powerful nations—
the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China—ensures republican-democracy for some, trumped by 
the autocracy of an elite few. 
In 1917, a republican workers’ council—soviet—in St. Petersburg, Russia helped initiate 
the Bolshevik Revolution with the ultimate aim of creating an egalitarian society based on 
universal suffrage, workplace democracy, a global republic, and the abolition of private 
property.71 The Bolsheviks developed chapters of their party in almost every nation, appealing 
particularly to academics and the most oppressed classes, races, genders, and nations.72 The 
Bolshevik Revolution, nevertheless, achieved none of its major goals, all of which were either 
impossible or unlikely without AIRC. The lack of a global economy, ideology, and 
communication system all contributed to the absence of a global revolution, and thus the 
formation of a global republic. By the time the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, 
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1922-1991) was founded, the soviets had been subdued by the central government. In 1920, Leon 
Trotsky—the once democratically elected chairman of the St. Petersburg soviet turned general—
began subjecting disobedient workers to military discipline, including capital punishment.73 
Money, private property, taxes, and wage labor were all reintroduced by 1922.74 Finally, even 
the geographically limited, bureaucrat-dominated Russian republic evolved, within a decade, into 
one of the most autocratic non-monarchical governments in history.ii 
The Internet would not have necessarily solved these problems, but would almost 
certainly have made them more obvious to outside observers. Russia’s geographic isolation, the 
widespread murder of dissidents, government monopolization and manipulation of information, 
and the human capacity for uninformed optimism contributed to the paucity of reliable 
information about the Soviet Union.75 Initial supporters of the Bolshevik Revolution—such as 
John Reed, Emma Goldman, George Orwell, and Richard Wright—typically had to witness its 
post-revolution polity first-hand to realize that it was not fulfilling the ideals of the revolution, 
though not all of them left these encounters alive.76 From 2008-9, while in Kathmandu, I 
witnessed a similar phenomenon among supporters of Nepal’s Maoists, who lauded the Maoists 
from afar, only to become more nuanced after arriving in Kathmandu. Nevertheless, the 
Bolshevik Revolution’s experiments with local participatory democracy, resource sharing, and 
its hopes for global, republican solidarity make it one of the most politically and intellectually 
polarizing events to this day. Many advocates of democracy still believe in the Bolshevik 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ii Like all autocrats, however, Stalin did not have absolute power, nor was his leadership 
absolutely secure. A few days into Germany’s invasion of Russia, the Politburo surprised Stalin 
at his dacha to request that he centralize more power into his own hands. As they arrived—
knowing how badly he had mismanaged the war—Stalin “crumpled in his chair,” assuming they 
were there to arrest him. This insecurity may help explain why Stalin had tens-of-thousands of 
his own officers executed during the war. See: Braithwaite, R., (2007). Moscow 1941: A City and 
its People at War, (pgs. 82-3, 332). Profile Books: London. 
 28 
program, despite its technological basis—instantaneous, limited communication—having been 
transcended by the 1980s. 
 
Abundant, Instantaneous, Recorded Communication 
 The Physical Properties of AIRC 
Communication production, storage, and transmission costs have decreased exponentially 
over the last few decades, allowing for more communication than ever before, and necessitating 
the creation of a universal, digital language: binary code.77 Humans of most linguistic 
communities now utilize convenient interfaces—such as keyboards and screens—to interact with 
computers that digitize and record audio, visual, and linguistic communiqués. Software responds 
in prescribed, algorithmic manners to this digital input, before translating its digital output back 
into easily understandable audio-visual communiqués.78 The speed at which these computations 
take place make users feel that they are communicating directly with one another, even though 
each communiqué has been translated to and from a much longer script, and may have traveled 
thousands of miles from one computer to another. 
Exponentially increasing production, storage, and transmission capacity has created 
increasingly smaller computers. Portable, handheld devices produce a variety of multi-media 
communiqués that can immediately be posted to the Web for anybody to consume, and which 
potentiate the consumption of any public information at any time, anywhere. Digital photography 
and sound technology have already transformed their respective fields. Academics, meanwhile, 
have benefitted immensely from the Web, which functions as a decentralized library with easily 
searchable information. Owners of information have found it increasingly difficult to maintain 
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monopolies on intellectual property, but nevertheless try to repress file-sharing and government 
and corporate whistleblowers. 
 The Political Implications of AIRC 
AIRC has the power to enable everybody-to-everybody communication for the first time 
in history. Unlike conference calls and other forms of one-to-many communication, chat-rooms 
and message boards enable all participants to simultaneously produce abundant written 
communiqués, which can later be located via search-engine and consumed at leisure. Before the 
Internet, labor costs made it infeasible for everybody to engage in dialogic, democratic 
resolutions to any social conflict anywhere. With AIRC, it costs more to exclude people than to 
simply allow everybody access to everything. Oppressive social structures, processes, and anti-
democratic ideology—not technology—are what prevent peaceful, global, participatory 
governance from becoming a reality. 
Mass accessibility to communication—and thus governance—potentiates a paradigmatic 
shift in people’s participation in global decisions: from professional participation to voluntary. 
Currently, many impactful decisions are monopolized by those with power over others, and 
oftentimes are made by people uninterested in the issues at hand, who engage in intellectual 
labor merely to accumulate social and financial capital.iii There is no longer a technical reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
iii In his autobiography, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admits to have habitually 
worked on crossword puzzles to stay awake during NATO meetings that excluded diplomats of 
non NATO-member states and the public of NATO countries themselves. During one 
unnecessarily long NATO meeting in Bucharest in 2008, Gates, Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice, and President George W. Bush bargained with one another as to who could leave, and who 
had to stay to represent the U.S; this, despite the fact that thousands of peace activists would 
likely have voluntarily attended the meeting and perhaps have advocated for policies 
representative of a majority of U.S. citizens polled at the time—such as cutting national defense 
spending, and a quicker withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq. See: Gates, R., (2014). Duty: 
Memoires of a Secretary at War, (pg. 194). Alfred A. Knopf: New York. Also: 
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for one’s physical location or occupation to determine which decisions he or she engages in. 
AIRC allows interest to be the determining factor in how individual’s choose which of society’s 
billions of processes to engage in. Exclusionary, coercive, and parochial processes are 
nevertheless endorsed by autocrats, republicans, and even those trying to advance democracy, 
including residential and workers’ cooperatives, participatory budgeting experiments, and social 
theorists.79 
In Here Comes Everybody (2008), Clay Shirky details how hierarchal organizations are 
necessary to coordinate the actions of thousands of people who cannot all communicate with one 
another effectively.80 Slight reductions in coordinating costs allow for greater managerial 
efficiency.81 Massive reductions in coordinating costs, as is the case with AIRC, allow 
everybody to communicate with everybody, thus making managerial oversight and hierarchy a 
hindrance to communication.82 Mass, networked, voluntarily produced projects such as 
Wikipedia, Flickr, and Linux already exist. Each of these social projects involve more 
collaboration than could possibly be managed by a professional class, or commissioned by an 
owning class. Instead, people have voluntarily worked according to their abilities to 
cooperatively solve commonly perceived needs. Such a volume of voluntary labor, moreover, 
cannot be monetized without omnipresent monitoring. AIRC ultimately makes coerced, 
monetized labor—like republican governance—a counterproductive practice upheld by 
repression and hegemony. Peaceful, global, participatory governance has become not just 
possible, or phenomenologically preferable, but potentially more efficient. 
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Service. Retrieved on 3/9/14 from gallup.com. 
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 Digital Democracy 
Speculation about future technology and its ability to transform society is a worthy 
academic pursuit, practiced by people such as theoretical physicist Michio Kaku, who believes 
immortality and teleportation to be technologically feasibly in the near future.83 Rather than 
speculating, however, I will limit myself to technology that currently exists and pose a 
hypothetical polity that is democratic, egalitarian, and in which labor is voluntary. 
A hypothetical individual in an immediately realizable society could log onto the Internet 
from his or her home and access a global educational policy website. Having previously worked 
for the non-profit One Laptop Per Child, he or she believes each person should have a personal 
computer, and that classrooms for children should have accommodating workstations.84 He or 
she searches the educational website’s list of proposals, finds a trending one that fits his or her 
specifications—or creates one, if there are none—and votes for it. Browsing the education 
discussion board, our individual comes across a popular critique of the One Laptop Per Child 
proposal. The critique claims that providing everybody with a personal computer is a waste of 
resources and encourages anti-social behavior. The author proposes that adults should not lecture 
groups of 20-30 children, and that classrooms should be redesigned for interest-led group activity 
with minor adult supervision, according to the School in the Cloud educational method 
developed by Sugata Mitra.85 This proposal is itself critiqued by a person claiming that he or she 
is the true follower of Sugata Mitra, whose initial Hole-in-the-Wall educational experiment 
should guide educational policy.86 This person proposes that children be free-range, their 
whereabouts monitored only by electronic implants, and that computers be incorporated into all 
indoor and outdoor urban infrastructure for people to use at their leisure. Along with this 
proposal is a promotional video depicting what life might be like if ‘all the children were as free 
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as the dolphins in the sea.’ Our individual finds this third option anxiety inducing, so votes 
against it, writes a scathing comment, and votes for the first two options. He or she may check on 
the proposals at any time to see which one is winning, and change his or her vote accordingly. If 
any of the proposals he or she has voted for or against are modified by their original author, our 
individual will be alerted via his or her electronic profile, at which point our individual can 
modify his or her vote. 
Without having to go anywhere, our individual has engaged in more direct, democratic 
processes than have most people alive today. This lack of movement is not due to laziness. 
Rather, only a system this accessible can enable constant participation among billions of people. 
Any political system requiring a few hours for each effort—or days between communiqués—
could never enable so much cooperation between so many people. This digital democracy may 
not appeal to autocrats, or republicans who distrust people and believe they need to be managed. 
It should, however, appeal to all democrats, as well as all republicans who genuinely believe in 
representational democracy. By the Law of Large Numbers, the least representative system 
imaginable would be lots of people voting on one person to represent them. By the same law, the 
more numerous the voters for each issue, and the more widespread the voting pool, the more 
representative it is of the entire population. Global participatory democracy works insofar as 
people trust millions of strangers to make all the decisions they don’t have time to help with. 
Sharing 
Every day, there are billions of quotidian social conflicts that simply require sharing, 
which can be determined digitally. Sharing is already deeply ingrained in most cultures, and 
would be even more so if society was organized around it. In Society Against the State (1987), 
anthropologist Pierre Clastres writes about his time with the Guayaki, a small, polyandrous 
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group of Amazonian hunter-gatherers. One of their ultimate taboos—which may make them 
physically sick if broken—is for a Guayaki man to eat the meat of an animal he has killed.87 At 
the end of the day, each hunter distributes his kill to his family, but never eats the meat prepared 
by his—often shared—wife.88 This culturally coerced interdependence helps the Guayaki 
preserve solidarity in the face of social conflict. AIRC allows society to coordinate such 
egalitarian sharing among billions of people. 
Right now, a person can make a dinner reservation using the website/app OpenTable.89 
Each account—linked to an email address—can make one reservation per time slot. The time 
slots, however, are allocated on a first-come first-serve basis. The participating restaurants, 
meanwhile, require monetary payments for services. In a hypothetical non-market economy, 
insofar as there are people who voluntarily cook for and serve strangers—which there may or 
may not be—a person could make an online reservation at a free restaurant. If more than one 
person tried to make a reservation for the same time slot, rather than resolving this conflict on a 
monetary and first-come first-serve basis, a software program could award the reservation to the 
person who has not used that particular service in the longest. If there are multiple people for 
whom this applies, a random winner could be selected algorithmically and alerted immediately. 
With a system of deference and lotteries in place, people could bid on whatever they like and 
always be assured an objective, fair outcome.  
 This system of sharing could easily replace the consumer goods market, the real estate 
market, the labor market, etc. It would require some democratic decisions regarding various 
timeframes for various goods—like yearly reservations of domiciles, weekly job reservations, 
daily food reservations, and hourly restaurant and movie theatre reservations. Rather than a 
monetized market based on socially necessary labor value, supply, and demand, the market 
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would simply consist of what exists. If nobody decides to mine diamonds, diamonds will not 
appear on the market no matter how many times society votes to allocate everybody one 
diamond ring. Voluntary—rather than coerced—labor is phenomenologically preferable, would 
indicate what goods are truly worth people’s while, and would incentivize reductions to 
humanity’s currently unsustainable environmental transformation. 
These democratic and egalitarian governing methods have historically worked at the local 
level. This does not mean that parochial societies are morally advantageous. Egalitarian and 
democratic societies will often expand until experiencing insurmountable logistical difficulties at 
which point they must either stay exclusive or increase overall cooperation through oppressive 
means. The requisite hardware for global, participatory governance now exists, as does much of 
the software. Websites like OpenTable, FreshDirect, Ticketmaster, Meetup, and Craigslist 
currently allow customers to reserve spaces, commodities, and services, but run on monetary or 
first-come first-serve bases, rather than algorithmic sharing mechanisms. The software merely 
requires slight modification. Society, on the other hand, requires more radical transformations.  
 
Participatory Budgeting Experiments 
  PB in Porto Alegre 
 In 1989, prompted by local democracy activists, the municipal government of Porto 
Alegre, Brazil bestowed a portion of its budget to a council of representatives from local labor 
unions and residential committees.90 Citizens voluntarily attended meetings to discuss how to 
spend the money, proposed budget items, and voted on them. Despite high rates of individual 
turnover from year to year—as one might expect from time-consuming voluntary labor—overall 
participation grew consistently.91 Out of this network grew countless neighborhood associations, 
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which not only engaged in PB, but mobilized crowds with political aims such as claiming control 
over more of the municipal budget, and demanding a greater police presence at local schools.92  
 Porto Alegre’s PB has been less a manifestation of democratic ideals, and more an 
expression of technological capacities and the dialectic between autocratic, republican, and 
democratic forces. Without regular access to AIRC, local assemblies would dialogically come to 
decisions, then send representatives to do the same at more centralized meetings.93 After one 
year, inter-group hostility forced the meetings out of the hands of particular community 
organizations and into what was perceived as more neutral municipal facilities.94 The entire 
operation, meanwhile, has been dependent on funding from the government, albeit a 
democratically elected republican one. When the Workers’ Party lost the 2004 municipal 
election, the incoming Popular Socialist Party vowed to maintain the participatory councils, but 
gradually exerted more control over them in the coming years.95 
 Porto Alegre’s PB movement has since spread to more than 1,500 cities worldwide.96 The 
participating nations—which include almost every nation in the world besides China and 
Russia—typically practice other neo-liberal policies, including alienating responsibility for social 
welfare, health care, and even military functions to the private sector. Thus, alienating legislative 
functions arguably benefits both the governments involved, and the newly empowered citizens. 
  NYC-PB: Mobilization Successes 
 In 2011, Brooklyn’s District 39—where I was born, raised, and lived at the time—was 
one of four initial NYC districts to institute PB. Citizen participation in budgeting was one of 
many struggles throughout the decades by District 39’s residents to exert control over their 
communities, whether by challenging discriminatory housing practices, or by organizing stroller 
rallies to stop New Deal redevelopment in Downtown Brooklyn.97 Like in Porto Alegre, NYC-
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PB involves government cooperation and funding—approximately $1 million per district, per 
year—but is largely managed by a handful of community organizations: in particular the 
Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP), Community Voices Heard (CVH) and the Urban Justice 
Center’s Community Development Project (CPD). In two years, these governmental and non-
governmental organizations facilitated the participation of 10-20,000 people who otherwise 
would have had no direct, democratic control over taxpayer money.98 
In what is said to be an attempt to ensure the participation of all New Yorkers, even those 
who are too poor to access the Internet, NYC-PB consists mostly of face-to-face meetings. There 
is a way to post ideas and vote online. On pbnyc.org, however, and on my Councilmembers’ 
website, the links to “participate” and “vote” don’t allow users to do either digitally, but instead 
prompt them to attend meetings, show up at polling sites on election days, and go door-to-door to 
tell other people to vote, go to meetings, and go door-to-door to get more people, etc., a ‘get-out-
the-vote’ strategy pioneered by Jacksonian Democrats in the early 19th century.99 This strategy 
was not used to create Wikipedia, which has coordinated the creative, voluntary participation of 
over 20 million people to write over 30 million articles with almost a billion edits.100 The 
budgeting process begins with Neighborhood Assemblies, where everybody is lectured on what 
kind of project is eligible—only infrastructure development—even if they already know this. 
People then split up into groups of five to ten, taking turns voicing ideas and writing them down 
on giant pieces of paper, which are later digitized, often by unpaid interns. In the second stage, 
Budget Delegates attend an informational meeting, then form subcommittees corresponding to 
municipal departments: Parks and Recreation, Transportation, Education, etc. These smaller 
groups later meet to discuss the ideas from the Neighborhood Assemblies, are supposed to make 
site visits to all the potential development locations, then must call their municipal departments 
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to price the projects. The Budget Delegates are supposed to continue meeting every 2-4 weeks 
for 3-4 months to check in with one another, all the while supposedly turning as many ideas from 
the Neighborhood Assemblies into ballot items as possible. A few weeks before the vote, the 
Budget Delegates are encouraged to make giant posters for all their projects, which are then 
displayed at face-to-face expos. Lastly, people are encouraged to vote at polling sites where their 
residency—not their citizenship—is confirmed. Voters receive giant paper ballots with sparse 
descriptions of each project in their district, and may vote for five of them, rather than vote for 
one, deliver yes or no votes on every single project, or vote on anything outside their city council 
district. At every stage of the process, Councilmember staff and the community organizations 
canvass participants for their email addresses. The only digital part of NYC-PB for the average 
participant is the regular promotional emails they might receive from the community 
organizations and Councilmembers. 
  NYC-PB: Mobilization Failures 
NYC-PB has not just failed at prompting participation among non-whites and lower 
income earners equal to their citywide demographics. NYC-PB has been worse at this than the 
republican electoral system they believe to be unjust.101 Almost every privileged group—whites, 
people with incomes over $75,000, people over 35 years old, and those with more education—
were not only overrepresented with respect to citywide demographics, but with respect to their 
involvement in 2009’s citywide, republican elections.102 These discrepancies generally became 
worse between years one and two of PB in NYC. The major exception was women, who have 
been overrepresented in both years of NYC-PB relative to their demographics and their 
participation in 2009’s city council elections despite note being targeted for participation.103 The 
minor exception is people in the lowest of income bracket—under $10,000—who are still 
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underrepresented with regard to their demographics, but did vote in 2013’s PB process at a 5% 
higher rate than they did in the 2009 city council elections. This is likely not due to but rather in 
spite of the process’ dependence on face-to-face meetings, and might instead have to do with the 
fact that two of the main organizations that run NYC-PB—CDP and CVH—are political action 
groups that primarily serve low income communities, and thus can mobilize these communities 
using ‘get-out-the-vote’ tactics already developed for traditional elections. 
Aside from rampant social injustice, I believe the primary reason for NYC-PB’s 
widespread underrepresentation of traditionally disenfranchised social groups to be its 
underutilization of AIRC. As CDP’s research and policy intern in summer 2013, I conducted a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of 33 telephone interviews with Budget Delegates—out of 
274 participating Budget Delegates from 2012-13.104 The most frequent Budget Delegate 
complaint (12 out of 39 overall complaints) was that the process required either too much time or 
inconvenient times. Of those 12 complaints, seven blamed the meetings, while only two blamed 
coordinating pricing with city agencies. Only one respondent—who was from the richest 
participating district, and who herself was not a housing project resident—complained that 
people in the housing projects lacked Internet access. As a Budget Delegate facilitator in 2013-4, 
I spent more time planning, traveling to, and attending face-to-face meetings than helping my 
Budget Delegates with their raison d’être: pricing the projects. None of my Budget Delegates, 
moreover, lacked Internet access. 
I am not suggesting that all impoverished New Yorkers have Internet access, and thus 
could participate equally in a digitized process. Only 86% of Americans reported having Internet 
access in 2013.105 New Yorkers were well within the first standard deviation regarding state-by-
state home-Internet access in 2011.106 What I am suggesting, however, is that those New Yorkers 
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who can’t afford Internet access are less likely to be able to attend time-consuming, face-to-face 
meetings, especially given that people with less free time have even less free time in common. 
The vast majority of responding Budget Delegates (23 of 28) reported spending only 0-3 hours 
per week on their projects, which is close to the amount of time they likely spent traveling to 
meetings, and may even include that time. 7 of 12 people who complained about time issues 
reported spending between 0-3 hours per week on PB, including one participant who claimed to 
have spent zero hours calling departments and pricing projects on his own. 
 NYC-PB: The Vote 
On election days, participants gather in common locations and typically spend a few 
minutes voting for up to five budget items from lists of 10-25. As far as I can ascertain, the 
number of ballot items is due to the paper ballots, as well as the need to reserve voting locations 
and thus get as many voters through the polls before the reservations end. The first casualties of 
face-to-face paper balloting are almost all past budget items that do not receive funding, which 
typically do not carry over to the next year’s ballot. Thus, each year, most of the work 
accomplished by Budget Delegates—much of it unnecessary—is discarded. 
Time-consuming labor processes and face-to-face paper balloting also effect which ideas 
from Neighborhood Assemblies are turned into ballot items. Budget Delegates theoretically 
represent their communities by turning as many ideas from Neighborhood Assemblies into ballot 
items as possible. Due to the labor-intensive process, those who have copious free time or are 
personally vested in a project are more likely to provide the labor needed to complete it, 
oftentimes only doing so for the projects they wish to see funded. 13 of 33 responding Budget 
Delegates explicitly stated that their reason for becoming a Budget Delegate was to advance a 
personal project. The second most frequent complaint by responding Budget Delegates (10 of 
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39) had to do with these conflicts of interest. Requiring Budget Delegates to work on random 
projects might help, but would likely reduce overall participation. Mandating that Budget 
Delegates work on one random project for every project they choose to work on has also been 
proposed at NYC-PB Steering Committee meetings, but has not been adopted. These solutions 
are problematic, as coerced labor does not necessarily result in quality labor, would necessitate 
more managerial oversight, and would go against PB’s ethos of voluntary participation.  
The NYC-PB facilitators have attempted to reduce the social conflicts within 
subcommittees by encouraging subcommittees to compete with one another. Knowing that 
winning projects are typically between $100,000 – $300-000, facilitators from each 
subcommittee urge Budget Delegates to bundle or cut various projects to meet these standards, 
rather than encouraging Budget Delegates to more accurately represent the ideas proposed at 
Neighborhood Assemblies. Facilitators for each subcommittee are told by those who run NYC-
PB to discourage Budget Delegates from creating as many ballot items as possible—their alleged 
raison d’être—due to the increased likelihood that a subcommittee will have more winning 
projects if they only have 3-6 projects on the ballot. Such tactics—reminiscent of 
gerrymandering and pork-barreling—are designed to exploit technical loopholes and manipulate 
voters, not to encourage as much and as equal participation as possible. 
Participatory Budgeting, as it is currently practiced, may not live up to the ideals of those 
who envision it to be a model for a more participatory, global society. NYC-PB may not even 
live up to the immediate goals of its practitioners. In many ways, NYC-PB mirrors the 
democracy it wishes to replace, and is ultimately subordinate to it. PB, nevertheless, has become 
one of the most intellectually and culturally important factors in promoting participatory 
democracy throughout the world. It may not be creating the social processes for global, 
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participatory democracy, but is helping to create the requisite social networks. PB even 
contributes to the necessary technical infrastructure. Ballot items for computers have constituted 
more than a fifth of winning projects in NYC-PB from 2011-3, by far the largest subset of 
projects voted on by AIRC hungry New Yorkers. Digital options would almost definitely 
increase overall participation, might equalize participation among social groups, would allow for 
more leisurely deliberation, and would enable voters to deliver yes or no votes on an unlimited 
amount of projects. The Councilmembers and community organizations that manage the 
meetings, events, and the get-out-the-vote campaigns might find their time and resources put to 
better use providing Internet access to people without it, possibly calling people before the vote 
to see who doesn’t have Internet access and bringing smart-phones, tablets, or laptops to their 
homes or jobs. The likelihood that professional organizations that sustain themselves through 
market relations will purposely negate their usefulness is small, as will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 2. Mass movements with democratic, egalitarian demands typically involve networks of 
volunteers with little left to lose, and who thus are willing to take utilize unorthodox methods to 
achieve unpredictable results.
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CHAPTER 2: THE REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL OF CROWDS 
Crowds as Historical Actors 
Throughout history, relatively unorganized, mostly unarmed citizens have amassed in 
public to influence or overthrow their governments. Crowds may use primitive weapons—such 
as flaming sticks and stones—but can devastate cities with the speed of a professional, modern 
air force. Though crowds have been the midwives of revolution, their inability to govern has 
excluded them from mass participation in newborn polities. Thus crowds are traditionally one of 
three historical actors in a revolution: the other two being existing elites and awaiting elites. 
The same logistical problems that have prevented crowds from governing are what make 
them the most likely harbingers of peaceful, global, participatory governance in the Internet age. 
Crowds are networks of small organizations and individuals generally acting voluntarily, not 
hierarchal organizations designed to coerce labor and bodily sacrifice out of working and 
martyred classes. The need for members of crowds to eventually go home, eat, sleep, and work 
makes their voluntary demobilization practically inevitable, as opposed to professional armies, 
whose voluntary demobilization is unheard of. Many members of revolutionary crowds have 
subsequently taken part in rapid, post-revolution remilitarizations, as was the case in Napoleonic 
France, Bolshevik Russia, and Khomeini’s Iran.107 The Nepali revolution of 2006, on the other 
hand, has shown that remilitarization is not inevitable, but rather contingent on specific social 
processes that do not always arise. Now that the technological prerequisites for peaceful, global, 
participatory governance have been met, revolutions manifested by networks of volunteers so 




  Revolution’s Stage: Geography and Demography 
Revolutions—rebellions that significantly alter social hierarchies—typically involve both 
traditional warfare and political crowds.iv Revolutions fought predominantly in rural areas—such 
as the Cuban and Chinese revolutions—rely on professional armies. These armies may be well 
armed, but nevertheless rely on guerrilla tactics to strike at the government’s periphery. These 
professional, hierarchal organizations are simultaneously the revolutionaries, and the elite in 
waiting. Crowds are an almost entirely urban phenomenon, including the plague-ridden, 
Athenian crowd that dethroned Pericles, as well as those manifested during the French, Russian, 
Egyptian (1952 and 2011-3), Iranian, East German, Nepali, and Tunisian revolutions.108 One 
notable geographic exception to this is the 1930 Salt Satyagraha, in which Indian crowds 
marched through cities, towns, villages, down rural roads, and to uninhabited beaches throughout 
South Asia, the most densely populated rural region on earth.109 Still, it is reasonable to assume 
that as humanity urbanizes, crowds will play an increasingly pivotal role in politics. The more 
populous a crowd, the less it must rely on advanced weaponry and instead on solidarity. Armed 
only with torches, rocks, and each other, crowds have amassed in broad daylight to directly 
confront governments at their geographical center, occasionally forcing professional militaries to 
leave, disintegrate, or stay in their barracks.110  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
iv While crowds took control of Cairo, Tehran, and Kathmandu—in 1952, 1979, and 2006 
respectively—the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Communist Party, the Iranian Mojahedin 
and Feda’iyan parties, and the Nepali Maoist party all fought traditional wars against the 
government in the countryside. See: Azimi, F., (2008). The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A 
Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule, (pg. 222). Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge. Also: Botman, S., [Daly, M.W. ed.] (2008). “The liberal age, 1923-1952,” in The 
Cambridge History of Egypt, Volume 2: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth 
Century, (pg. 306). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. And: Tucker, F., (Fall 2012). “Jana 
Andolan: The people’s movement in Nepal,’ in Zeteo: The Journal of Interdisciplinary Writing, 
(pg. 9-16). 
 48 
Theatrical Violence and Non-Violence 
People’s aversion to violence is demonstrated in the streets. Revolutionaries and 
governments alike gain cultural legitimacy—and thus solidarity—with massive, public, non-
violent demonstrations, such as speeches, street theatre, and poetic yet political chanting.111 Both 
revolutionaries and governments also gain legitimacy through effective use of violence perceived 
as self-defense.v Thus, street theatre could be said to include a member of Occupy Wall Street’s 
‘Black Bloc’ gesturally or linguistically teasing a member of the New York Police Department in 
order to provoke well-publicized repression. Acts like these may appear masochistic if devoid of 
context, but can be politically advantageous if sensed by an audience that might become solidary 
and help overpower the ‘aggressor.’ Arundhati Roy, whose words have won her the Booker Prize 
and have provoked lynch-mobs—directed at her—said about the guerrilla warfare of the adivasi 
in Central India’s jungles:112 
The Gandhian ethos is a very frightening ethos in the forest; because the 
Gandhian ethos [is a] performance that requires an audience... And in the 
forest, there’s no audience… In a society that doesn’t belong to the rest 
of society… how do hungry people go on a hunger strike? How do 
people who don’t have any money not pay their taxes or do civil 
disobedience?113 
 
Non-violent crowds benefit from their violent potential, which they use to achieve 
political goals. Revolutionaries, like the governments they oppose, typically resort to violence 
only after many non-violent methods of resolving conflict have failed. The Bolsheviks, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian People’s Mojahedin, and the Nepali Maoists all contested 
republican elections when allowed, led strikes or boycotts, and only went to war after these 
tactics proved unfruitful.114 The cycles of the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1899, meanwhile, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
v The U.S. president with the highest approval rating—post WWII—was George W. Bush in 
September of 2011. See: Gallup (20014). “Presidential approval ratings – Gallup historical 
statistics and trends.” Retrieved on 3/9/14 from gallup.com. 
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corresponded with ongoing drought, becoming move violent when the rain abated and subsiding 
when farming became fruitful.115 The world’s most notorious practitioners of non-violence either 
resorted to violence themselves—such as Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress—or 
were part of larger mass movements that contained violent elements, as was the case of Gandhi’s 
involvement in Indian Independence, and Martin Luther King Jr.’s involvement in the Civil 
Rights and Black Power movement.116 
Gandhi cemented his status as charismatic leader of crowds—and elite in waiting—by 
practicing organized non-violent resistance: satyagraha. Much of the British government and 
much of the Indian populace found Gandhi’s satyagraha phenomenologically preferable to the 
rural guerrilla warfare and violent, urban riots that were occurring contemporaneously.117 Like 
most leaders, Gandhi mediated the relationship between the British government and the Indian 
populace by publicly articulating demands and privately negotiating with both sides. His status 
as satyagrahi gave him the additional power to provoke popular hatred and concerted action 
against the British by subjecting himself and his followers to violence without allowing it to 
escalate.118 If Indian crowds attacked the British, Gandhi insisted his satyagrahi “army should be 
ready to cope with any emergency” and “still the frenzy of mobs… [with] a few hundred, maybe 
a few thousand… spotless deaths [to] once and for all put an end to the riots.”119 Each side was 
coerced into obeying him out of fear of the repercussions of the symbolism of his death. His 
moral authority, the political importance of his mediation to both sides, and the power of a 
culturally resonating gesture allowed Gandhi to control, to a certain degree, the policy of one of 
history’s most powerful empires, and the actions of millions of his sympathizers by publicly 
refusing to eat.120 
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Mobilizing the Troupes 
Crowds generally are coalitions of various social groups—including political parties, 
unions, and kinship networks—as well as unattached individuals. These people coalesce around 
economic, political, and/or repressive conditions commonly perceived to be unbearable. These 
conditions typically have social origins, but are left unaddressed due to a political impasse 
between opposing social groups. These political impasses are resolved by demonstrations of 
collective power either coercing one side into conceding, or outright warfare that ends in new 
social dynamics. 
 In Toward of Theory of Revolution (1962), James C. Davies linked economic crises and 
mass mobilizations with his now famous ‘J-curve theory:’ “revolutions are most likely to occur 
when a prolonged period of economic and social development is followed by a short period of 
sharp reversal.”121 Most rebellions suggest this increased likelihood, including the 2010-13 
Global Rebellion, which occurred shortly after the Great Recession of 2008-9. What Davies’ 
theory did not account for, however, is why successful rebellions—revolutions—occur so 
infrequently compared to recessions and depressions. The 2008 subprime mortgage crisis 
recessed global GDP, most dramatically in the U.S. and Europe, where revolutions did not occur. 
In Tunisia and Egypt—where revolutions did occur—GDP slightly recessed and grew 
respectively. 
In States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions (2004), Misagh Parsa compares the Iranian, 
Nicaraguan, and Filipino revolutions of 1979-85, helping explain why economic conditions 
contribute to revolutions and to what extent. Parsa points out that overthrown governments have 
been highly invested (>33%) in the economy and have thus been more likely to become the focus 
of workers’ struggles, which otherwise would have been directed against the capitalist classes.122 
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Parsa also asserts that revolutions are more likely to overthrow highly exclusive governments, 
particularly ones dependent on foreign investment.123 Parsa details how dependent the Iranian, 
Nicaraguan, and the Filipino governments were on U.S. aid, concluding that it allowed these 
governments to ignore the demands their populaces.124 The American, Haitian, Indian, Chinese, 
Cuban, East German, South African, Nepali, Tunisian, and both Egyptian revolutions also 
overthrew governments that either were heavily dependent on foreign aid or centered in foreign 
locations. 
Parsa’s studies also focus on the coalitions that make up revolutionary crowds. Parsa 
posits that financial crises—similar to highly exclusive polities—contribute to revolutions by 
prompting broad coalitions to form between the consistently rebellious working classes and the 
newly destitute members of the middle and upper classes.125 His research and that of Ervand 
Abrahamian into the demographics and demands of the Iranian crowd show it to have been 
predominantly students, intellectuals, clergy, middle-class shopkeepers, and white-collar 
government employees whose demands focused mostly on winning political freedoms and 
ending government violence.126 High-school and university students were found to be especially 
active due to being “highly concentrated in colleges and universities,” where their “extensive 
communication networks… facilitate their collective action.”127 The Iranian, Nicaraguan, and 
Filipino revolution would likely not have succeeded without late-stage general strikes by the 
working classes, a feature that has stymied the 2014 civil unrest in Venezuela.128 In Iran, 
Nicaragua, and the Philippines, ongoing government repression of crowds led workers to 
mobilize and commandeer factories in the name of protesting the repression, and to demand 
political rights—the right to vote and unionize—not higher wages or lower taxes.129 Economic 
desperation may exist to a certain degree in all revolutions, but is not typically people’s primary 
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concern. Nevertheless, economist Mancur Olsen was not alone when he posited that rational 
individuals only act in groups for monetary benefits and that political action is either a 
roundabout way of achieving personal economic advantage or else is motivated by lunacy.130 
Likely aware of this strain of public discourse, the militant crowd of the Iranian Revolution made 
unambiguous their political aspirations by destroying banks, police stations, and the British 
Embassy, while leaving cash, jewels, carpets, and other consumer goods untouched.131 
People’s aversion to violence is demonstrated by the fact that government repression 
often stimulates resistance, which in turn necessitates further repression. In The Crowd in the 
Iranian Revolution (2009), Ervand Abrahamian describes how Shi’a mourning cycles of 40 days 
drove the Iranian revolution throughout 1978. Crowds would mobilize around public funerals for 
those killed 40 days earlier, which repeatedly culminated in the killing of more crowd members, 
thus prompting more mourning periods, and more mobilizations for public funerals—some of the 
best opportunities for renewed resistance.132 The Nicaraguan and Filipino crowds manifested 
most dramatically after popular leaders—Chamarro and Aquino—were assassinated. The Nepali 
revolution used the sixteenth anniversary of the 6 Apr 1990 massacre that ended Jana Andolan 
(‘people’s movement’) to mobilize the crowd that would eventually overthrow the monarchy on 
24 Apr 2006 in Jana Andolan II.133 The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was predominantly 
mobilized by two groups: the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said,” made to commemorate 
and mobilize around the deadly, public beating of a young anti-corruption activist; and the April 
6 Youth Movement, named after a textile worker strike in 2008 that ended in the death of four 
workers at the hands of the police.134 Occupy Wall Street activists similarly mobilized people 
around the deaths of the aforementioned Oscar Grant, as well as capital punishment victim Troy 
Davis.135 While there is little historical precedent for republics to be overthrown by crowds, any 
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militarized government has the potential to initiate cycles of violence that can change social and 
political dynamics rapidly and thoroughly. 
 
Networks and Organizations  
Crowds have been incapable of post-revolutionary governance insofar as that has meant 
the organized, systematic oppression of millions. In Theory of Collective Action (1965), Mancur 
Olson gives a variety of practical and psychological reasons as to why he believes people cannot 
operate in large groups without coercion, and how people free of coercion tend to break into 
groups of less than twenty.136 The practical reasons were legitimate pre-Internet concerns. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 1, many-to-many communication on equal footing was not feasible for 
groups of much more than twenty until recently. Since groups of millions were more powerful 
than groups of twenty, hierarchal governments based on one-to-many communication were likely 
to develop and did so independently of one another—in Africa-Eurasia, as well as in the 
Americas. His psychological hypotheses, however, seem less credible. Given the plasticity of 
human psychology, it seems likely existing anti-large-group mentality and behavior is more 
contingent on historical developments than on irreversible phenotypes.137 A global, network-
based society based on AIRC in one language, everyday speech in local languages, and 
memories of a global, crowd-based revolution would likely create a pro-large-group mentality, as 
well as respect and gratitude toward foreigners. 
In Poor People’s Movements (1977), political scientists Frances Fox Piven and Richard 
Cloward argue that the lack of formal organization that makes militant crowds unsuitable for 
post-revolution governance is the very facet that enables them to cause revolutions in the first 
place. Piven and Cloward describe the network of black “clergymen, small entrepreneurs, 
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professionals, and labor leaders” that were able to mobilize the 1963 March on Washington 
specifically because of their lack of economic ties to the white world.138 They compare this with 
the Unemployed Workers’ Movement during the Great Depression and their experience in the 
Welfare Rights movement of the 1960s, both of which were more effective in their riotous 
chrysalis stage, before crystalizing into hierarchal organizations.139 The leaders of these 
organizations were not simply bribed by the government but nevertheless stymied spontaneous 
mobilizations in order to attribute more resources to lobbying, national election campaigning, 
and their own organizational elections.140 Piven and Cloward’s mobilization theory helps explain 
the roles of various religious institutions in mass movements. Neither the Iranian Shi’as—before 
1980—nor the American Protestants were hierarchically organized, which could explain their 
widespread support during the Civil Rights Movement and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when 
each mobilized congregations and crowds from the relative safety of their religious spaces—and 
in Ayatollah Khomeini’s case from an even safer exile.141 The official stance of the Catholic 
hierarchy toward the Nicaraguan and Filipino governments, on the other hand, played a large 
role. The Catholic Church was somewhat hostile to the Nicaraguan government and thus allowed 
its clergy to mobilize freely.142 In the Philippines, however, the Catholic Church allied with the 
government, forcing revolutionary priests underground.143  
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has stayed relevant through 80 years of tumultuous change 
by being both an organization and a network. The Brotherhood has been outlawed for most of its 
existence, but despite this has operated a party of hundreds of thousands from Egypt’s capital, 
contesting elections through alliances with legal political parties and unions, and running 
‘independent’ candidates that sometimes it cannot even control.144 The hybrid nature of the 
Brotherhood was displayed throughout the 2011-13 revolutionary period. A week before the 25 
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Jan 2011 mobilization, the Brotherhood tried to calm people by calling for “constitutional 
struggle” to end three decades of martial law.145 The day before the mobilization, which by then 
promised to be significant, the Brotherhood’s leaders officially endorsed it but implored their 
cadre to respect a 5 p.m. curfew.146 A few days into the mobilization, which had become one of 
the largest in world history, the Brotherhood gave its unequivocal support.147 After Mubarak’s 
ouster—as it became clear that no inchoate party could contend with the Brotherhood in 
elections—it officially decried the continued occupation of Tahrir Square, while allowing its 
cadre to attend mobilizations “as an individual, not as a Muslim Brother.”148 The Brotherhood 
supported the Democratic Alliance’s calls to boycott parliamentary elections, then participated in 
them at the last minute, winning a plurality.149 Afterward, they promised to not field a 
presidential candidate, then won the presidency with Muhammad Morsi.150 After this, the 
Brotherhood used the full coercive powers of the party, the government, and the police to 
prevent anti-government mobilizations, to mobilize their own pro-government crowds, to pass a 
new constitution, to exclude rival parties from office, and to gain control over the military’s 
leadership.151 The military went along with this until July 2013, when anti-government crowds 
again immobilized Cairo. Only then did the military oust the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
reclaimed its outlaw status. Contrasting the Muslim Brotherhood’s political vacillations with 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s 17 years of unequivocal demands for the Shah’s removal, it is not 
surprising that the Brotherhood lacked revolutionary legitimacy needed to kill thousands in an 





Occupy Wall Street 
  Established Organizations 
The uneasy relationship between networks and organizations marked the 2011 Occupy 
movement. Adbusters, a “global network of artists, activists, writers, pranksters, students, 
educators, and entrepreneurs” initiated the mobilization.153 The most successful actions of the 
2010-13 Global Rebellion were either not planned by professional organizations like political 
parties or labor unions, or happened despite the opposition of these organizations—including the 
General Strike in Oakland and the occupation of the Brooklyn Bridge.154 Anarchists, socialists, 
progressives, and libertarians came together in Zuccotti Square, largely agreeing that the U.S.’ 
financial elite—“the one percent”—had brought about the Great Recession and were handing its 
aftermath just as poorly. As the occupation of Downtown Manhattan’s Zuccotti Square 
continued, however, the myriad ideological groupings made clear their intractable differences in 
how they believed society should be organized. In my experience, those who occupied Zuccotti 
Square every day and night were typically in their 20s and generally believed that the 
government had to be overthrown and replaced with a non-republican system. On the weekends, 
older professionals came as flâneurs, or to engage in political discussions, typically with the 
mindset that the Occupy movement would only amount to anything if it could affect the 
republican political landscape. 
One organization whose involvement in Occupy Wall Street paralleled—in several 
ways—the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in the 2011 Egyptian revolution was the Working 
Families Party (WFP), of which I was an employee at the time. WFP is a paid-membership-
based organization primarily backed by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and 
the Communication Workers of America (CWA).155 WFP effects government policy through 
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lobbying—while promoting the slogan “get big money out of politics”—and by paying its 
employees to attend political rallies and campaign for members of the Democratic Party in 
almost every election while constantly telling both its employees and its members that it is “an 
independent third party.”156 I began to suspect my employers of cultivating a “cult-like culture” 
in the workplace soon after working there, only to have this suspicion confirmed while attending 
a WFP leadership conference in winter 2013, at which they gave out a pamphlet that stated 
“build[ing] a cult-like culture” was a key tenant of their organizational strategy.157 
WFP did not initially mobilize around for Occupy, but was driven to support Occupy—
and soon became one of its largest institutionalized supporters—only after the mobilization had 
succeeded to occupy Zuccotti Square. This success was due in part to WFP’s employees. From 
the outset, almost every one of my coworkers at WFP—myself included—attended Occupy 
regularly. Many, like myself, participated after work and on the weekends, while about ten were 
among the few dozen people who slept in Zuccotti Square every night. After about a week, 
WFP—while publicly championing Occupy—used its coercive power as an employer to stop 
most of my coworkers from attending Occupy during working hours. WFP meanwhile secretly 
paid at least four of my coworkers to stay at Occupy full time, despite its protestations to the 
public and its employees that the right-wing media was crazy for suggesting this.vi As Occupy 
wore on, WFP began to mobilize protesters out of Zuccotti Park, incorporating them into its 
ongoing campaign to get large corporations to pay more taxes.158 In December, after Occupy had 
been defeated by the NYPD, Bob Masters—WFP’s co-chair and political director of the NY 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vi The media was wrong about WFP scouting for full-time protesters on Craigslist. WFP had 
plenty of employees who were willing to voluntarily stay at Occupy full-time, and simply paid 
four of them to continue, hoping they’d represent the interests of WFP in Zuccotti. See: The 
Week Staff, (11 Oct 2011). “Occupy Wall Street: Are protesters being paid?” in The Week. 
Retrieved on 4/7/14 from theweek.com.  
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chapter of CWA—explained WFP’s attitude toward Occupy at the winter leadership conference I 
attended. To all my coworkers—some of the most dedicated and ideologically driven members 
of Occupy Wall Street—Masters claimed that the occupation of Zuccotti Park was bad for WFP, 
but that the movement’s rhetoric, particularly “we are the 99%,” was beneficial and would be 
adopted by WFP to mobilize voters in the 2012 general election. Because of these comments—
and the unapologetic admission of cult-like practices—many of my coworkers became as 
disillusioned with WFP as they had been with the republican system they thought they’d been 
fighting as employees of WFP. The Working Families Party may do the opposite of much of its 
rhetoric, but is nevertheless a viable organization that takes concrete steps to achieve the most of 
the goals stated on its website.159 The same cannot be said for most of the experimental 
organizations that evolved during Occupy Wall Street. 
 Establishing New Organizations 
The largest attempt to organize the crowd at Occupy Wall Street was the New York City 
General Assembly (NYC-GA). The NYC-GA had etiquette similar to that of most anarchist 
meetings I have witnessed and taken part in. It was open to participation by anybody present in 
Zuccotti Square, all of whom could vote and all of whom were expected to give constant 
emotional feedback to speakers by wiggling their fingers in the air to signal positivity, and down 
at the ground to signal negativity.160 Like the Grand Council of the Iroquois Confederacy, the 
NYC-GA consisted of oral communication aimed at achieving consensus. The facilitators of the 
NYC-GA claimed that consensus was needed to protect ‘minorities,’ by which they meant 
women and people of color, both of whom are majorities in New York City and would 
technically benefit from majoritarian democracy.161 Unlike the Grand Council, however, 
hundreds of people participated in the dozens of assemblies. Despite the increasingly 
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manipulative tactics of the NYC-GA’s facilitation crew, the NYC-GA was only able to get 
hundreds of people to reach consensus a few times in the course of two months.162 The NYC-GA 
nevertheless persisted daily, both because of its symbolism, and because supporters around the 
world had donated over a half-million dollars to it.163 
The leaders of Occupy quickly realized they could not handle the direct participation of 
everybody involved and formed a republican organization called the Spokes Council. The 
Spokes Council would vote to allow new groups, which would only be allowed two 
spokespeople—one male, one female—per meeting. The Spokes Council, however, was unable 
to get funding and so embarked on a mission to get the NYC-GA to vote to hand over its money, 
which was held by the newly created non-profit Friends of Liberty Plaza. Even using the rules 
they’d invented—and the institution of “emergency proposals”—the advocates of the Spokes 
Council had to bring their proposal to the NYC-GA five times in one week before getting a 
crowd to deliver a 90% modified consensus.164  
In The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), Karl Marx writes, “great historic facts 
and personages recur twice… once as tragedy, and again as farce,” a sentiment that continues to 
apply to contemporary events.165 Just as Olson had theorized in 1965, Occupy Wall Street was 
unable to govern large groups without coercion and subsequently resorted to smaller ‘working 
groups.’166 These groups were ostensibly as participatory as the GA but had a habit of leaving 
Zuccotti Square unannounced to undisclosed locations once they’d expanded beyond twenty 
people.167 Just as Piven and Cloward had theorized in 1977, Occupy seemed to have a dramatic 
effect on American politics insofar as it mobilized coalitions of social groups, but has since 
fallen off the political landscape despite the continued existence of the NYC-GA and Spokes 
Council, which serve the leaders of these small organizations by proposing agenda items like 
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trademarking ‘Occupy Wall Street,’ funding renovations to the their new Harlem office, and 
organizing “Occupy House Parties” that address the “unfortunate fact of human nature that we 
more eagerly listen to our peers than to people we don’t normally bump into in our sphere of 
existence.”168 The Egyptian crowd, meanwhile, overthrew its autocratic leader, Hosni Mubarak, 
then successfully toppled the Muslim Brotherhood-led republican government in 2013 and now 
faces the almost certain election of Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in an even less democratic 
process than the one that brought the Brotherhood to power. Try as they might, the crowds in the 
Global Rebellion of 2010-13 have been unable to come up with national polities more inclusive 
than republicanism. Until they do, crowds will continue to be the tragic heroes of revolutions, 
providing the drama with sticks and stones and satire, but ultimately dying for another’s benefit. 
 
The Role of AIRC in 21st Century Rebellions 
Communication is not the most difficult factor in mobilizing militant crowds. The 
continuing paucity of rural crowds large enough to battle professional armies in the digital age 
suggests that rapid transportation is a more pertinent variable, negated only by urbanization for 
now. In cities, the main mobilizer of crowds is not tactical communication via text-messsage, but 
the public communication of popular complaints like voting rights, high food prices, or the 
assassination of a popular leader. Once enough people are in the streets of a city, the rest of the 
city does not need to be told about it, but can see for themselves. 
 The same parochial mentality that leads contemporary scholars to envision AIRC-enabled 
local workers’ and residents’ councils is displayed in their discussion of the impact of AIRC on 
revolutions. Clay Shirky applies his theory of drastically reduced labor costs to explain how 
rebels in Belarus can mobilize flash-mobs at the press of a button.169 Journalists dubbed the 
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Iranian Green Movement of 2009 the “Twitter Revolution,” and the Egyptian revolution the 
“Facebook Revolution.”170 The Egyptian government may have accepted this narrative and tried 
to curtail the mobilization by shutting down AIRC. Mobilizing in Tahrir Square on 25 Jan 2011 
and torching the National Democratic Party headquarters a few days later, however, was not a 
random plan hatched by organizers and disseminated to everybody at the last minute to surprise 
the police. It was a logical, foreseeable course of action derived from the common knowledge 
and pride of Cairenes, who had amassed in Tahrir Square on 25 Jan 1952 and burned the 
buildings of the British, who promptly ended their military occupation.171 
Insisting that AIRC is important for mobilizing particular crowds obscures the fact that 
instantaneous communication gives humanity the potential to coordinate global mobilizations. 
The Global Rebellion of 2010-13 involved plenty of global solidarity, but was never based 
predominantly on calls for global governance. In The Revolutions Were Tweeted, Gilad Lotan, et 
al., document the extent to which Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries used AIRC to inform 
the world of their actions, turning journalism into “a conversation.”172 Many Occupy activists 
were not only aware of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, but had watched and listened to 
them in real time. I had attended anti-war rallies of hundreds-of-thousands in D.C. and Chicago, 
and had interviewed participants of Jana Andolan II in Kathmandu. I was nevertheless skeptical 
about claims that largely unarmed, unorganized crowds could withstand assaults from 
professional militaries and topple governments until I watched the Egyptian revolution on my 
laptop from the comfort of my bedroom. Occupy’s digital activists thoroughly recorded and 
disseminated almost every mass action and NYC-GA meeting, often incorporating activists from 
around the world into these meetings via Skype. What Lotan doesn’t suggest, however, is that 
AIRC has the power to turn individual revolutions into more than spectator sports. Without a 
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globally coordinated revolution, which requires globally recognized demands, spectators will be 
sure to witness periodic social conflict that is never fully resolved. 
Most importantly, AIRC is needed the morning after the revolution. The various social 
processes that make people’s lives so unbearable require restructuring. AIRC allows global 
consumption and labor to be organized according to people’s abilities, wants, and needs, rather 
than their social and financial capital. AIRC enables conflicts about what merits legitimate wants 
and needs to be resolved democratically, as well as broader questions about the overall direction 
of humanity. It is this newly realized governing potential that may allow humanity to finally 
break the revolutionary cycle in which governments are overthrown by coalitions who then fight 
among one another to establish dominance in a new social hierarchy. AIRC allows society to 
manifest both a global revolution, and a political evolution.
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Peaceful, global, participatory governance is possible, but has not been realized due to 
anti-democratic social processes and ideologies, forces so salient that global democracy is not a 
popular demand anywhere. The omnipresent chant during contemporary American mobilizations 
of ‘tell me what democracy looks like! This is what democracy looks like!’ is indicative of the 
populace’s conception of democracy. It may indicate belief that democracy is a dialogic process 
engaged in by people within shouting distance of each other. It may indicate awareness that 
republics sometimes only respond to mass mobilizations. Finally, taken literally, it may indicate 
that many Americans react positively to the word ‘democracy,’ and may believe that they live in 
a ‘democracy,’ but have never experienced group deliberation and voting to resolve intractable 
ideological differences in a timely manner, and fear the thought of submitting to the will of the 
majority even though they will likely be in the majority a majority of the time. 
A democratic culture must be fostered for democracy to become a popular demand. 
Democracy will not spontaneously arise the morning after a revolution regardless of how many 
people have access to the Internet, and no matter how many police stations and party 
headquarters are torched. Participatory Budgeting instills a democratic culture among millions of 
people worldwide. Its parochialism, however, solidifies millennia old notions that democracy is 
only practicable among a finite group of people. If democratic experiments are to resonate with 
outside communities, they must not continually develop more subtle tactics for exploiting 
loopholes while creating ever more complex bylaws to address these inconstancies. A 
democratic experiment that expands its demographic and geographic scope by mastering 
simplicity will gain more allies. 
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Finally, democratic movements must withstand repression from militarized, non-
democratic governments. This is not too difficult a task. Professional militaries can be overcome 
by crowds of ordinary people mobilized by commonly perceived problems with manageable 
solutions halted by political gridlock resolved only through coordinated action. The use of mass 
mobilization by democratic movements everywhere does not derive from convenience. Rather, 
the form follows the function. Ideological differences can also be overcome by groups of 
ordinary people discussing commonly perceived problems with manageable solutions halted by 
political gridlock resolved only through voting. These similarities between crowds and 
democracies make them both powerful only insofar as participants can overcome minor 
differences to maintain the mightiest force on earth: solidarity. 
 
Persistent Republics 
There is little historical precedent for republics to be overthrown by crowds. Only two 
crowd-enabled revolutions—Russia (1917) and Egypt (2013)—have overthrown republics, both 
of which were second stage revolutions. The Russian and Egyptian republics had just come to 
power, had not had time to fill their militaries with loyalists, and were popularly perceived as 
being associated with or being no better than the recently toppled autocracies. Republics have 
been toppled through by armies through wars and coups, but have never been overthrown by 
crowds after surviving the initial revolutionary stage. 
Republics do not avoid being overthrown by avoiding mass mobilizations altogether. 
Regular elections force ruling parties to respond to popular unrest or risk being replaced by other 
professional political parties. Multi-party, parliamentary republics are particularly malleable. 
Minor parties can pull out of governing coalitions at any time, thus necessitating new coalition 
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formation or calls for early elections. Disenfranchising certain social groups undermines the 
electoral process, but allows for extreme exploitation, which typically leads to rebellion in the 
absence of electoral recourse. These rebellions don’t necessarily have to threaten to overthrow 
republics to garner a response. They merely have to attain solidarity with enough enfranchised 
groups so as to reshape the national electorate.173 The prevalence of mass mobilizations shows 
that republics do not represent the will of the populace, but the will of elites to stay in power, 
including making concessions when receiving existential threats. 
The Global Rebellion of 2010-3 did not disprove Francis Fukuyama’s post-Cold War 
observation regarding “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western 
liberalism.”174 Autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt were overthrown. Major rebellions throughout 
Europe ended with coalitions dissolving and new republican governments being voted in to 
office. Occupy never came close to capturing a single city—let alone overthrowing the U.S. 
government—and resulted in no major changes to the government or financial industry. The 
crowds of various cities seemed aware of this dynamic as well. Occupy’s most popular slogan 
“we are the 99%,” demonstrated unfulfilled yet still hopeful expectations of representation. The 
Arab crowds on the other hand had no reason to expect representation and so demanded an end 
to the regime—“ash-sha’ab yurid isqat an-nizam.” Given the potential power and the rational 
politics of crowds, it is less likely that republics are indestructible and more likely that crowds 
have had the power to overthrow republics but have purposely not done so, knowing of no 
viable, systematic alternatives. 
The only thing that can disprove Fukuyama is the creation of a viable, systematic 
alternative. New communications technology has transformed the world in many ways since the 
end of the Cold War. Social conflict and political gridlock, however, stymie society’s productive 
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and political potential. Autocratic and democratic forces continue their opposition, resulting in 
republics here, military dictatorships there, autocratic private relations everywhere, and 




Globalization is a historical force with no agenda. Not necessarily good or bad, 
globalization is shaped by prevailing social dynamics. The overwhelmingly negative connotation 
toward globalization among democracy and peace activists indicates their losing of the 
immediate battle to guide globalization. Whether good or bad, many features of globalization—
particularly global communications methods and networks—are preconditions for peaceful, 
global, participatory governance. The global, capitalist economy stimulates these global social 
networks even against the will of those who wish people to remain separated. Even the quest for 
global domination eventually provokes more global unrest. 
AIRC makes everybody-to-everybody sharing, negotiation, and democracy technically 
possible. The failure of the Kyoto Protocols displays the need for global cooperation. The long-
term benefits of stabilizing climate change require short-term sacrifices, which require global 
participation. If nuclear-armed nations—who cannot be bombed into submission—do not 
cooperate, they will gain power relative to the nations that make sacrifices, while reaping the 
environmental benefits of said sacrifices. The need to incorporate everybody into the same polity 
has spawned massive cooperative movements throughout history, from the Iroquois 
Confederacy, to the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, all of which were limited by their 
respective communication methods and prevailing power dynamics. 
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The power of cooperation drives oppressors toward consolidation, no matter how much 
they glorify competition. The economic tendency toward monopolization and society’s 
increasing dependence on AIRC has vaulted nine telecommunications, software, and hardware 
corporations into the world’s top fifty.176 By increasing their share of the market, these 
corporations not only profit, but garner additional profits by disallowing their customers free-
market recourse. Additional profits afford additional influence in republican governments, which 
increases profits further by disallowing customers’ democratic recourse. When people fail to 
resolve conflict economically or democratically, however, they resort to collective action made 
more potent by global communications networks. Telecommunications companies will find it 
hard to avoid this conundrum. If one doesn’t exploit emerging markets, another one likely will. 
The best they can hope for is to further repress social movements while further enabling them. 
  Observation 
 The authoritarian actions of militarized republics can be equally counterproductive. The 
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has teamed up with major telecommunications companies 
to monitor almost every digital communication it can.177 The obvious beneficiaries of this 
program will be future historians, who will rely much less on conjecture than we do. The second 
greatest beneficiary, however, is likely not the U.S. government. The greatest threats to 
governments are crowds, which are not conspiratorial, cannot be stopped by a few arrests, and 
often grow stronger if repressed. The NSA spying program is not a debilitating economic, 
political, or violent transgression on the order of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, the Amritsar 
Massacre, or the sub-prime mortgage scheme and subsequent bank bailout. The NSA spying 
program is, however, a cultural transgression along the lines of Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak grooming his son to succeed him; or the British using pig and cow fat to grease the rifle 
 71 
cartridges that touched the lips of their Hindu and Muslim soldiers; or the shopping habits of 
Imelda Marcos and Marie Antoinette.178 Revolutions are built on coalitions of social groups 
mobilizing around commonly perceived injustices—all the better for the mobilization if the 
injustice has done little to actually disempower social groups, or one that brings many outraged 
groups together. The NSA spying program and other recent accusations show that the U.S. 
Executive Branch has little trust in anybody, including its NATO allies and colleagues in 
Congress.179 Insofar as millions of people maintain trust in the U.S. Executive Branch—wielder 
of the largest military in human history—public knowledge of the NSA spying program violates 
that trust, and represents a cultural coup for social movements everywhere. 
  The End of History? 
 In the last few hundred years, humanity has streamlined the harvesting and burning of 
fossil fuels, with potentially apocalyptic consequences. Peaceful, global, participatory 
governance depends on global revolution, which itself depends on globally perceived problems 
with social origins and unresolvable political gridlock. There is perhaps no belief more universal 
than humanity’s connection to and dependence on nature. Whether spiritual or materialistic, this 
belief has been held, fetishized, and worshipped by tribes, clans, castes, nations, and members of 
secular civil society. By continuing to burn fossil fuels, humanity is literally and figuratively 
playing with fire. Nevertheless, the likelihood that humanity will unite under a peaceful, global, 
participatory government is only increased insofar is it is the only political solution to our 
potential extinction. 
 There remains one disturbing fact of life in the 21st century. Humanity may manifest a 
global revolution with so much support from every social sector that the world’s militaries hand 
over their weapons peacefully, only to see them calmly, rationally dismantled, or burnt in an 
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orgiastic global festival that lasts all night. People may wake up the next morning and share all 
natural and labored upon materials according to their needs, and work according to their abilities. 
Still, the shadows of nuclear-powered, nuclear missile equipped bombers may continue to hover. 
Nuclear submarines might lurk beneath the seas. Our technological capabilities and political 
systems have made it so that one person could destroy all life on earth, a fact that has been 
dramatized pessimistically in movies like Fail-Safe (1964, 2000), and Dr. Strangelove or: How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964).180 There are two historical precedents for 
humans dropping nuclear weapons on urban areas. On the other hand, there is only one known 
instance where a person was ordered to initiate a two-way nuclear war. During the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Vasili Arkhipov was ordered to commit such an act and refused to do so.181 
Sometimes the fate of revolutions, even the fate of the world, can come down to people 
like Arkhipov, or General Abbas Qarabaghi, the Iranian Joint Chiefs of Staff who refused to 
bomb Tehran in 1979, or the Egyptian generals who refused to attack the Tahrir Square rebellion 
at its height in 2011.182 Countless revolutions, on the other hand, have been repressed with 
widespread violence. Humans have a mixed track record when it comes to obeying orders to 
commit massacres. Aside from the fact that humanity now possesses the tools to put its violent, 
autocratic ways behind it, nothing else is certain.
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